Indian Army Word After start War

The Indian Army unveiled its new war doctrine, a year ago, on 28 April 2004, and naming it as the “Cold Start War Doctrine”. Thereafter, in ensuing twelve months, the new war doctrine was circulated to all the Army Commands for discussion and comments at formation levels. In tandem, the Army Training Command (ARTRAC) and the Army War College were tasked to fine-tune the operational concepts of the doctrine.
Before moving further, it needs to be stressed that neither the Congress Government of the day nor the Indian Army should get lulled into complacency by the so called “peace-process” offensive launched by General Musharraf. While the politicians and the media may term this “peace-process” as “irreversible”, India ’s military history and military logic does not suggest so. Hence the Indian Army’s formulation of new war doctrines and validating the operational concepts through exercises is a timely step.
While the Indian Army understandably, did not release the finer text of this new war doctrine, except for some salient characteristics, this author with his exposures at the Royal British Army Staff College Camberly, NATO Armies and US Army in Germany, Japan and South Korea could analyse in great detail the Cold Start War Doctrine with special reference to Indian conditions. Readers may refer to the following SAAG Papers of this author:
“India's New “Cold Start” War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed.” (SAAG Paper No. 991 dated 04.05.2004) “Indian Army’s New “Cold Start” War Doctrine Strategically Reviewed-Part II: Additional Imperatives (SAAG Paper No.1013 dated 01.06.2004). Following the publication of the above two papers of this author, other websites in India and Pakistan reproduced these papers and generated an exciting debate on the pros and cons. In fact on one website, the debate still continues, even after a year.
“Cold Start War Doctrine”- The Military Significance in the South Asian Context:
The military significance of the “Cold Start War Doctrine” in the South Asian contest is being highlighted for the benefit of new readers, who may not have gone through the earlier papers referred above.
The major points of military significance in the South Asian context can be analysed as under:
The Indian Army after 50 years or so of defensive mindsets has finally put itself in an offensive operations mode. The defensive mind-set was imposed on the Indian Army by the political leadership of India who shied away and did not have the political will to use military power to secure the country’s national security interests. Indian Army has indicated that it now has plans and is ready to act offensively against Pakistan , or any other South Asian actor indulging in proxy war and terrorism against India . Indian Army will now be prepared to undertake offensive military operations at the very outset of hostilities breaking out. This is to deny Pakistan , or any other hostile South Asian state from counting on external intervention by their external patrons. India has in declaratory terms enunciated that it will undertake offensive operations short of nuclear war Though not in declaratory terms, but implicit in its intentions to bring the switch to offensive operations mode as a key element of strategy, India may also be conveying that military intervention or pre-emptive military strikes could be also a military option in South Asia .
Extending this analysis into the nuclear warfare domain, one could say that the addition to India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine that India would retaliate with nuclear weapons if Indian Armed Forces are subjected to nuclear, biological or chemical strikes, would provide a nuclear umbrella to Cold Start War Doctrine offensive strikes into Pakistan.
The Indian Army and the Indian Air Force has commenced the process of validation of the operational concepts of the new war doctrine. The first major exercise in this process, Exercise VAJRA SHAKTI took place in early May 2005 in the Punjab sector.
Ex VAJRA SHAKTI would be followed by a series of other exercises in the Rajasthan Sector in winter.
Ex VAJRA SHAKTI- The Salient Features:
Ex VAJRA SHAKTI was a 10 day exercise which took place in early May 2005. Ex VAJRA SHAKTI involved exercising an infantry division and an independent mechanized brigade of 11 Corps. along with associated armoured elements, integral to the Corps, to carry put offensive strikes at the outbreak of hostilities.
The significance of Ex. VAJRA SHAKTI lies in the fact that for the first time the Indian Army exercised an erstwhile defensive operations holding Corps in the Western Sector in offensive operations. Such defensive Corps would now be termed as “Pivot Corps”. These Pivot Corps while defensively preventing any Pakistani military adventurism into Indian territory , will concurrently launch offensive operations into enemy territory which could then be exploited by other strike formations.
The salient features of Ex. VAJRA SHAKTI, as collated from open sources, were as under:
Offensive strike operations were carried out by a Pivot Corps employing from its own resources an infantry division, armoured regiments and an independent mechanized brigade. The above offensive operations were exercised against the backdrop of a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare threat from the enemy. Special Forces were employed in pre-emptive strikes for furtherance of the offensive operations. Since Cold Start War Doctrine envisages swift, day and night operations, the offensive strikes were supported by advanced C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) network and systems. The above included the establishment of a Force Multiplication Command Post for integration and flow of real-time information of the enemy to combat units, collected by satellites, UAVs, aerial reconnaissance, radar networks, communication intercepts etc. Digital photographs of the enemy areas were transmitted real time to forward combat units, facilitating speedy decision-making by Commanders. Exercising of all of the above could be termed as the commencement of network-centric warfare in the Indian Army. Information-dominance of the battlefield was practiced by use of electronic warfare systems. The Indian Air Force provided 130 sorties for this exercise in a variety of roles from reconnaissance, fighter aircraft strikes, attack helicopter operations and Special Forces operations. It can be assumed that based on the lessons learnt in Ex VAJRA SHAKTI and their review, the other PIVOT CORPS of the Indian Army would similarly be exercised.
Some Points for Consideration by Indian Army Commanders:
The Indian Army has never lacked in military competence, drive and determination in the conduct of military operations with the exception of the 1962 debacle, which squarely in terms of responsibility lay on Prime Minister Nehru, India’s diplomats in China, Nehru’s close advisors and the Intelligence Bureau chief. Taking-off from this, Indian Army Commanders in relation to Cold Start War Doctrine need to ponder on the following points.
Political decision-making and directions by the Government of the day; what systems need to be put into place for speedy political decision-making and the ensuing crisis management, so that military operations are not ham-strung and surprise, the most essential ingredient of this doctrine, is not lost. Offensive operations of this doctrine would necessarily rest on effective collection, collation and assessment of enemy information, in the pre-ceding peace-time period. Intelligence has been India ’s bane, and the Indian Army needs to be persistent on this score with the Government. Offensive operations require an “offensive mind-set” in both officers and men. In the last 50 years or so, the Indian Army stood be-numbed with defensive mind-sets imposed by the political leadership. Indian Army Commanders need to set a peronal example in terms of boldness and professional audacity themselves and further motivate and imbue their commands by sustained motivation drives. Military audacity should be the hall-mark of Indian Army professionalism at all levels. War preparedness of a high-order at all times in terms of strategic reserves of weapons, equipment, ammunition, accessories and petroleum, diesel and aviation funl is required. Cold Start War Doctrine offensive operations cannot be launched on incomplete inventories. Similarly, strategic assets should not be worn out in peacetime disaster management. It was shocking to read in the media that the Indian Air Force aircraft meant for air-refueling in long range strikes, being used for carrying fuel to Kashmir Valley in the last winter; similar use of transport aircraft and helicopters is inexcusable. The Government should create separate assets for disaster management and not use Armed Forces assets earmarked for military operations, which as it is are difficult to replace due to inordinate delays generated by politicizing defence acquisitions, with change of governments. Concluding Observations:
Military exercises are an invaluable component of a nation’s war-preparedness. War preparedness has to be an ongoing, vigilant and persistent effort. It cannot be based on the reading of intentions of nation’s adversary by the political leadership of the day. We went wrong in 1962 because of this fatal flaw. While peace proces can be perused, so also war preparedness with greater intensity and vigour.
Ex VAJRA SHAKTI has therefore been a welcome development. It needs to be followed up by similar exercises by the PIVOT CORPS and more importantly by the combat commands which will provide the cutting edge of Cold Start War Doctrine offensive strikes. The operational concepts need to be validated and fine-tuned by repeated exercises of this type. Then only victory will be ensured in war.

Kargil War

What A Way To FightIn:The summer of 1999, India and Pakistan fought a 73 day military conflict in the upper reaches of Kashmir at Kargil, located 120 miles from the capital city of Srinagar. The Kargil conflict merits intensive study because:

It was a major conflict between two countries possessing nuclear weapons.

Despite grave provocations and the intensity of armed skirmishes, the conflict remained limited in terms of time, geographical area, and weaponry.

The conflict was a clear manifestation of a 50 year-old sub-continental rivalry that has portents of a nuclear conflagration affecting global peace and security.

The confrontation was a revealing example of asymmetric conflict, wherein opposing combatants employ markedly different resources and strategies in an attempt to maximize their advantages and exploit the opponent's weaknesses.

India is a maritime nation strategically straddling the Indian Ocean with or substantive seaborne trade. The country’s economic well being is thus very closely linked to our ability to keep our sea-lanes free and open at all times. Besides, India has other maritime interests as well. Our island territories situated on our Western and Eastern seaboards are at considerable distances away from the mainland. To ensure their sustained development, umbilical linkages with the mainland and maritime security protection are essential pre-requisites of our maritime security. Our offshore assets within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 2.02 million sq. kms, fisheries and deep sea interests, major and minor harbours and the overall seaward security of long coastline and island territories are other vital aspects of our maritime dimension and Navy’s responsibilities.

Indian Air Force

Fighter Jet

Mig-27 Fighter

This weekend was great and back at office on a boring yet bright Monday morning! The morning is bright coz’ it’s sunny and not that cold and boring coz’ the traffic was slow moving on the way to office. ha!! typical Bangalore. cannot do much about it.
Is one particular thing that always itches the back of my mind, does a ‘knock knock’ and goes off…And It knocked once during this weekend also.Mig 21 fighter planes. Ever since these planes came in to Indian Air force, They make news for two reasons. One - During the Republic day or Independence day Defense displays . Two – Crash due to a Technical snag or pilot errors.But I always wonder…why Mig 21 alone??

The MiGs have been dubbed "flying coffins" for registering over 100 crashes from 1993 till date. Indian air force says 2005 proved a safer year for them recording very lesser Mig 21 Crashes.

According to Financial Express, from the beginning of the 1990s Russia stopped operating the MiG-21 and producing spare parts for it, and for this reason India has to buy low-quality spare parts in the East-European countries.

The official statistics claim that 283 crashes occurred from 1991 to 2000, in which the Air Force of India lost 221 aircraft, and 100 pilots perished. As many as 62 per cent of the cases involved the MiG-21 fighters made by the HAL in the 1960s. The "human factor" caused 42 per cent of the crashes, technical malfunctions - 44 per cent, and collisions with birds - 7 per cent. Hmm.. Statistics are always scary!

And 2006 should have started with a sour note for IAF with MIG 21 Crash earlier this month on 4th near NAL airbase ,Bikaner fortunately with no casualty.But according to Air Chief Marshal H Moolgavkar (Retd), PVSM, MVC , If a pilot is competent, there would not be so many crashes. However, just like no two human beings are the same, no two pilots are the same, and the significant number of accidents is due to pilot errors as proved in the courts of inquiry which are meticulously held by the competent authorities directly concerned. So, it is unfair to conclude MiG-21 aircraft as flying coffins.

He also accepts that Mig 21’s are indeed a difficult aircraft to fly and there are technical failures for which heavy price is paid in terms of loss of both precious lives and investment.He also says it is difficult to provide a clear cut answer. If the situation permits, a pilot ejects from the aircraft and generally he lands safe.

In 2003 the then Defense Minster George Fernandes tested for Mig 21’s ‘airworthiness’ by flying for nearly half-an-hour in a 20-year-old two-seater trainer version in overcast conditions.Obviously he must have chosen a very experienced pilot!!

Life of a fighter plane pilot is not easy. Still Its Indian Air force’s duties to make sure that at least technical snags are minimized. And this is what IAF has promised. After all the one who is flying the plane somehow could eject himself … a fighter plane falling straight on your head when u just took three days off from work to spend time with your wife and children in your farm house is really scary engof.

It is hereby notified

It is hereby notified that due to unavoidable reasons the written examination to be held on 28.10.2007
is deferred to 25.11.2007 for
category no. 4 - Clerk Gr. II:
category no. 5 - Trains Clerk:
category no. 6 - Ticket Collector:
category no. 7 - Commercial Clerkunder employment notice no. RRB/PAT/1/05-06.The roll numbers and examination centres of the candidates will remain unchanged except one centre named - "T.P.S. CollegeChiraiyatand, Patna" which is shifted to "A.N. college, Boring Road, Patna". Now the candidates of this centre will have to report at - "A. N. College, Boring Road, Patna' on 25.11.2007.Accordingly the candidates who have not received admit cards for 28.10.2007 are advised to collect the duplicate admit cards on 22.11.2007 and 23.11.2007 instead of earlier notified dates 25.10.2007 and 26.10.2007.It is also advised to all concerned that the call letters issued earlier for the written examination dated 28.10.2007 will remain valid for free travel authority to SCs/STs for appearing at written examination on 25.11.2007.

Published in - TOI ( Times of India) date 24 October 2007
( We are not rensponsible, if you found any errors, please correspond concerned authority, organization)

How To Joine Indian Army

Applications are invited for 107th Technical Graduates Course (TGC) (Jul 2008) and 31st SSC (Technical) Course (Oct 2008)Entry Type - 1.
Technical Graduates Course for Engineering Graduates2. SSC (Short Service Commission )No. of Posts - 110For 107 th TGC (Technical Graduates Course ) - 58 post out of which Civil Engineer -18, Electrical Engineer-07, Mechanical Engineer - 02, Electronics Engineer -09, Electronics & Comm.
Engg/ Telecomm Engineer -14, Computer Science & Engineering /Information Technology (IT) - 06, Production/ Industrial/Manufacturing Engineer-022 Posts for - Military Farms : Agriculture/Dairy Stream -02For 30th SSC (Short Service Commission ) - 50 Posts out of which (Civil Engineer-18, Electrical Engineer - 04, Mechanical Engineer - 07, Electronics Engineer - 04, Electronics & Comm. Engineer/ Telecomm Engineer-12, Computer Science & Engineering / Information Technology -03, Production Engineer / Industrial Engineer / Manufacturing Engineer-02)Age Limit -For TGC Technical Graduates Course - 20 - 27 years ( Between 02 Jul 1981 and and 01 Jul 1988)For Military Farm - Between 02 Jul 81 and not later than 01 Jul 87For SSC Short Service Commission - 20 - 27 years ( Between 02 Oct 81 and 01 Oct 88.)
Last Date to submit application - 30th November, 2007To see datailed information - http://www.joinindianarmy.nic.in

A Karla Comfort vehicle image

A Karla Comfort, having the vehicle air brushed with the image of the 10 Marines was a way to pay homage to her hero and his fellow comrades who fell on Iraq's urban.